This paper provides estimates of the effects of the fall in financial and housing wealth in 2008-2009 on overall macroeconomic activity. These effects are large and account for a large fraction of the slowdown in activity. Much of the 2008-2009 recession is estimated to be simply standard wealth effects at work.
The extensive literature cited in Brunnermeier and Sannikiov (2014) is theoretical. 1 The various financial frictions that are postulated in this literature are too abstract to be taken directly to macro data. Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) use univariate forecasting equations and VARs to test for the effects of interest rate spreads on various macroeconomic variables. They argue that an increase in their estimate of the excess bond premium reflects shifts in the risk aversion of the financial sector, which leads to a decline in asset prices and a contraction of the supply of credit, which has a negative effect on economic activity. 
The MC Model
The MC model uses the methodology of structural macroeconometric modeling, sometimes called the "Cowles Commission" (CC) approach, which goes back at least to Tinbergen (1939 
Financial Wealth versus Housing Wealth in Consumer Expenditure Equations
The aggregate U.S. wealth variable in the MC model is:
where AH is the nominal value of net financial assets of the household sector excluding demand deposits and currency, M H is the nominal value of demand deposits and currency held by the household sector, KH is the real stock of housing, P KH is the market price of KH, and P H is a price deflator relevant to household spending. (AH + M H)/P H, denoted AA1, is thus real financial wealth, and (P KH · KH)/P H, denoted AA2, is real housing wealth. • h = household sector.
• f = firm sector.
• B$ = Billions of dollars.
• B2009$ = Billions of 2009 dollars. Remember that AA is equal to AA1 + AA2, financial wealth plus housing wealth. The wealth variable enters the equations as log(AA/P OP ) −1 , which assumes that financial and housing wealth have the same effect. This can be tested by using as the wealth variable log(λAA1+ ( Although there is slight evidence that financial wealth has a greater weight in the CS equation (but not in the CN equation), with the hypothesis that λ = 0.5 rejected for the first period (t-statistic of 2.46), the evidence is only slight, and for the rest of the results in this paper the combined AA wealth variable is used in both equations. this discussion is not repeated here. 4 The lagged wealth variable is significant for the first estimation period, but only has a t-statistic of 1.33 for the second. The interest rate is significant for both periods. The End test has a p-value of 0.005, so the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same before and after 2007:4 is rejected.
It will be seen in Section 6 why this might be so. There is slight evidence for the first period that housing has a greater weight, where the hypothesis of equality rejected with a t-statistic of 2.17. For the second period nothing is significant. Because the evidence in favor of housing wealth is slight, as was done for the CS and CN equations, for the rest of the results in this paper the combined AA wealth variable is used in the CD equation. 
•t-statistics are in parentheses.
•Estimation method is 2SLS.
•Variables are listed in Table 1 . Table 4 Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) also do not find significant financial wealth effects on consumption, but they point out (p. 20) that they do not have the statistical power to estimate financial wealth effects because of lack of good data on financial assets 
•RHO1 and RHO2 are first and second order serial correlation coefficient estimates.
•Variables are listed in Table 1. by zip codes. Zhou and Carroll (2012) , using data by states like CQS, also find insignificant financial wealth effects but significant housing wealth effects.
If constructing financial wealth by zip codes or states leads to larger measurement errors than constructing housing wealth by zip codes or states, then this could explain the insignificance of financial wealth versus housing wealth. The present results using aggregate data are quite strong regarding the overall significance of financial wealth. It would be hard, for example, to explain the boom in the U.S. economy in the last half of the 1990s without considering the huge increase in financial wealth in this period from the boom in the stock market.
Testing Measures of Credit Conditions
The consumer expenditure equations in Tables 2-4 Table 5 presents results for two spread variables, the BAA/AAA bond spread and EBP . For each equation estimates are presented for the interest rate, the wealth variable, and the spread. The BAA/AAA bond spread is not close to being significant in any of the equations. Although not shown in the table, the same was true for the spread between the AAA bond rate and the 10-year government bond rate. •Spread is BAA-AAA.
•See Tables 2-4 for the interest rate and wealth variables per equation.
•Spread is multiplied by CDA for CD equation. Similarly for EBP .
•Spread is multiplied by IHHA for IHH equation. Similarly for EBP .
Regarding EBP , it is not significant for the period ending before the recession except for the CN equation, where the t-statistic is -2.05. For the period through the recession it is not significant in the CS equation, but it is in the three others.
Adding EBP does not affect the significance of any of the interest rate and wealth variables. They are all significant expect for the wealth variable in the CD equation for the periods ending before the recession. The evidence for EBP is thus mixed, depending on how much weight one puts on possible data mining, since it was created after the recession was known. But it could be that EBP is capturing some effects on consumer expenditures not captured by the interest rate and wealth variables. This is examined in Section 8. gressions was it significant, and so there is no evidence that it has independent explanatory power. The labor income uncertainty variable, U nRisk, was also tried (lagged one quarter), and it was only significant in the CN equation, with t-statistics of -2.45 and -2.28 for the two periods, respectively. There is thus little support for this variable. 5 Whatever information CEA and U nRisk convey, it appears to be captured by variables already in the expenditure equations.
Estimated Effects of Changes in Financial and Housing Wealth
Before is the estimated effect of the AA1 change on that variable for that quarter.
The effects on total consumption expenditures (CS + CN + CD + IHH)
by quarters are presented in Table 6 . After four quarters expenditures have risen $22.0 billion, and after eight quarters they have risen $33.3 billion. The increases then level off at about $40 billion. The effect of a sustained increase in wealth on consumption expenditures is thus estimated to be about 4 percent per year ignoring any feedback effects. Table 6 IHH is unchanged.
If AA2 instead of AA1 is changed, this changes all four categories of expenditures because AA2 appears in all four equations. Results of increasing AA2 by $1000 billion are presented in Table 7 . In this case the expenditures peak at about $60 billion rather than $40 billion, although the effects wear off faster. 6 The roughly 4 percent estimate in Table 6 is consistent with results from other approaches. The size of the wealth effect is discussed in Ludvigson and Steindel (1999), where they conclude (p. 30) that "a dollar increase in wealth likely leads to a three-to-four-cent increase in consumption in today's economy," although they argue that there is considerable uncertainty regarding this estimate.
Their approach is simpler and less structural than the present one, but the size of their estimate is similar. Starr-McCluer (1998) uses survey data to examine the wealth effect, and she concludes that her results are broadly consistent with a modest wealth effect.
Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) (MRS) find 5 to 7 percent effects of housing wealth on consumption (p. 30), although these effects vary considerably across zip codes.
These numbers should be compared to the numbers in Table 6 because MRS do not examine housing investment, and so their estimated effects are somewhat higher than the present ones. Zhou and Carroll (2012) find 5 percent effects of housing wealth on consumption (p. 18), slightly higher than the estimates in Table 6 .
CQS test for asymmetrical effects and find that the housing wealth elasticity is estimated to be larger in falling markets than in rising markets. 7 Their estimated elasticities are 0.10 and 0.032, respectively. How do these compare with the present results? Take Table 6 Table 8 there are 17 large residuals, with 14 negative. The difference is due to the different estimation period. The estimation period when EBP −1 is added is considerably shorter.) When EBP −1 is added, there are 10 large residuals, of which 6 are negative. The (negative) residual for the CD equation for 2008:4 is 4.9 times its standard error without EBP −1 added and 3.8 times when it is added. Quantitative estimates of how much EBP contributes to explaining the recession are presented in the Section 8. 
where SH is the financial saving of the household sector, M H is its holdings of demand deposits and currency, CG is the value of capital gains (+) or losses (-) on the financial assets held by the household sector (almost all of which is the change in the market value corporate stocks held by the household sector), and DISH is a discrepancy term. CG is constructed from data from the U.S. Flow of Funds accounts. It is highly correlated with the change in the S&P 500 stock price index. Second, the relationship between P KH, the market price of housing, and the deflator for domestic sales in the model, P D, is
where PSI14 is taken to be exogenous. 9 An increase in P SI14 means that housing prices are rising relative to overall prices. For the experiment P SI14 was taken in each quarter to be its value in 2007:4, which is 2.0.
Third, the estimated shocks that occurred during the 2008:1-2013:3 periodthe estimated residuals-were assumed to be the same in the new regime. In the estimation these shocks are assumed to be iid. To summarize, the experiment consists of having U.S. stock prices grow at historical rates, of having housing prices grow at the same rate as overall prices, of using the same shocks, and of having no change in the historical values of the short term interest rate (which are mostly zero). The experiment corresponds to large increases in financial and housing wealth because in reality both U.S. stock prices and housing prices fell dramatically.
Results are presented in Tables 9-11 and Figures 5-14. Table 9 shows the effects on AA1 and AA2. After 8 quarters financial wealth is $7.36 trillion higher and housing wealth is $5.12 trillion higher. These are, of course, huge differences.
By the end of the period, 2013:3, financial wealth is about back down to its actual value, but housing wealth is still $4.33 trillion higher. The estimated standard errors (SE) on the differences are small, but not zero. They are not zero because AA1
and AA2 depend on more than just CG/(P X −1 Y S −1 and P SI14, respectively, which are constant. See equation (1). Table 10 is the key table. It shows the effects of the changes on the unemployment rate, U R, and private sector jobs, JF . The peak differences are in 2010:3, where the predicted unemployment rate is 6.10 versus 9.50 actual and the predicted tends to be small. Table 11 shows the effects on real GDP, GDP R, and the GDP deflator, GDP D.
In 2010:1 real GDP is higher by $875.4 billion. The GDP deflator is higher by Remember that this experiment takes the wealth changes to be exogenousactually CG/(P X −1 Y S −1 ) and P SI14 to be exogenous. Households respond to the changes after they have taken place. The wealth changes are not explained.
Also, the fall in housing prices before 2008, which likely triggered the future wealth changes, is not explained. Looking at the plots in Figures 1 and 2 from, Table 12 . These results differ somewhat from those in Table 10 because of the different estimation period for the four consumer expenditure equations. Second, the fourth of each of the four expenditure equations in Table 5 The results for the unemployment rate and jobs are presented in the bottom half of Table 12 .
Comparing the two sets of results in Table 12 had not fallen, the estimate is that the decline would have been 2.12 million less, or 7.44 million. 2.12 million is 22 percent of 9.56 million, which is much smaller to fall, this set off a chain reaction that led to the financial crisis. 13 The trigger period-144 quarters-in common, and this period is taken to be the "base" period.
These 144 observations onû t are used for the draws in the stochastic-simulation procedure discussed below. 14 There is a mixture of quarterly and annual equations in the MC model. For equations estimated using annual data, the error is put in the first quarter of the year with zeros in the other three quarters (which are never used). If the initial estimate of an equation suggests that the error term is serially correlated, the equation is reestimated under the assumption that the error term follows an autoregressive process (usually first order). The structural coefficients in the equation and the autoregressive coefficient or coefficients are jointly estimated (by 2SLS). Theû t error terms are after adjustment for any autoregressive properties, and they are taken to be iid for purposes of the draws. As discussed in the text, the draws are by year-four quarters at a time. 15 
